ABSTRACT Due to the confidentiality of the classified information system, it is isolated from the external network, but it is necessary to exchange data with an external network. This makes data exchange security between classified networks an important problem. Previous research focused on using access control policies to limit data access at different security levels, using some security checks to detect the security of the data itself. The security threat of the access control policy itself will threaten the data exchange between the classified networks. Moreover, the data should be performed security check isolated from user during the physical transmission to prevent the attack behavior which bypass the data security check from the user side. At present, the cross-network isolation and data exchange models are designed based on fixed business scenarios and lack generality. Therefore, this paper proposes a Turing machine-based theoretical model for cross-network isolated data exchange. This model consists of two parts: the proof system module and the physical transmission channel module. The proof system module uses an interactive Turing machine to model the part of the operational security and data security check of the communicating party's authority to provide security and versatility. The physical transmission channel module isolates different networks and provides a detection mechanism independent of the communication parties to ensure the security and efficiency of the transmission. The proof given shows that the theoretical model can exchange data efficiently and safely. Finally, based on the given theoretical model, an intuitive cross-network isolation and data exchange function model is constructed in the form of a functional tree to illustrate the model versatility.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the classified information system, the security of data is always concerned. The security of data exchange of the network platform -the classified network, which is composed of all the data in the classified information system, directly affects the data security of the classified information system. Therefore, under the requirement of the original security level, the efficient and secure data exchange between different classified networks has become a concern, therefore, network isolation and data exchange technology have developed. At present, the main popular network isolation and data exchange technologies mainly include BLP-based NIIE-BLP model [1] , anomaly detection-based isolation security model [2] , etc. The NIIE-BLP model
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implements the access control of data to the control of the network access mode that can be divided into dense levels by introducing a two-dimensional dense function on the BLP model [3] . It is essentially based on the access control policy to control the execution of data. And negligent access control rules are easily exploited by attackers to bypass access control attacks. The isolation security model based on anomaly detection pre-establishes various application behavior patterns to detect anomalies, the isolation security model based on anomaly detection pre-establishes various application behavior pattern detection anomalies, which is possibly invalid for the new attack application behavior pattern. Moreover, for different classified data exchange, the data transmission operation outside the authority is also an abnormal behavior. At present, many researchers try to reduce the challenges of network performance caused by the classic three parts of the network isolation and data exchange model: the action initiator, transmission channel and action receiver [4] , this is a good idea. However, even if the network isolation and switching system exists in the form of a third party, it also has three classic parts of isolation and exchange, so it should not be built to improve performance under the condition of sacrificing security, and the security of data exchange can be only guaranteed by real physical isolation. Therefore, being independent of internet and isolated from internet, isolate the threat of traditional network isolation and data exchange mechanism, and less network burden becomes a challenge. This paper is based on the principle that all operations are within the legal scope, and all changes are within the legal scope to detect the security of data exchange between the classified networks. Of course, there are no security threats such as monitoring, tampering, and interception. Therefore, In the three parts of data exchange, cryptographic algorithms [5] - [7] are introduced to ensure the security of the above missing. In the physical transmission of physical isolation, The paper [8] - [11] shows the high security line of one-way communication, so one-way communication is adopted, and the security detection mechanism is introduced to ensure isolation from the threat of bypass data sender security checks. Of course, this paper only ensures that the classified network will not pose a threat due to data exchange actions and does not ensure other forms of invasion of the classified network.
As a classical model of formal description, Turing machine [12] - [14] is simple in structure and flexible in grammar, which can accurately define computation, computable function and computational complexity. Any given computer algorithm can construct a Turing machine that simulates the logic of the algorithm. John E. Hopcroft and Jeffrey D. Ullman described in detail how Turing machine simulates computer operation in his monograph introduction to automata theory, language and computing [15] , Therefore, this paper uses the Turing machine to model the data exchange function and various security checks. That is to use Turing machine to construct a model for data exchange between classified networks -cross-network isolation and data exchange model, this formal model not only facilitates the strict proof of the security of data exchange, but also can describe various security protocol. It can add or reduce the security detection component according to the security requirements of the classified network itself to reduce the redundancy and the Turing machine itself does not pose a security challenge.
II. TURING MACHINE MODEL
The Turing machine is a computing model that abstracts and idealizes the calculation process, which can be used to describe all computing devices. All efficient computing devices can be equated with a Turing machine that stops at polynomial time. A Turing machine can be described as three infinite strips of paper: a read-only input strip T i , a readable and writable working strip T w and a writing-only output strip T o . Its definition is as follows 1. 
And D = {L, R, S} represent ''left shift'', ''right shift'' and ''no shift'' respectively on the tape. In the initial state q s , the input belt is x, the working belt and the output belt are both empty, i.e.
The state transition function takes as input the current state and the characters to which the input paper tape and the working paper tape are pointing, the read-write head moves in the direction given by D, The paper tape that the output tape and the working tape point to is modified to characters, the direction of the pointer movement, and the next state. When the state is q h , M stops, and the content of its output belt is y, recorded as M (x) = y. At the same time, in the case of no ambiguity, if M is stopped in state q a , it is also recorded as M (x) = 1, otherwise, it is recorded as M (x) = 0. In fact, there are Turing machines that can't be stopped, and this article only discusses Turing machines that can be stopped at finite steps. For a Turing machine, if the running time of any input x satisfies t ≤ (|x|), then say that the Turing machine can stop in T (· ) time, which called a polynomial time Turing machine. A Turing machine corresponds to a function, so if a function can be described by a polynomial time Turing machine, it is said to be polynomial time computable. A language can be accepted by a Turing machine if and only if the elements of the language can be accepted by the Turing machine. Then a Turing machine also corresponds to a language, all of the languages that can be described by the polynomial time Turing machine are called P language classes [12] .
Definition 2: Probabilistic Turing machine. A Turing machine can be called a probabilistic Turing machine when it has a read-only random paper tape T r in addition to the input tape, the working tape and the output tape, each element of the random paper tape is an independent and identically distributed random variable.
A probabilistic Turing machine M accepts the language L, if and only if the probability of the string in L is accepted by M is not less than 2 \ 3. All of the languages that can be described by polynomial time (binary) probabilistic Turing machines are called BPP language classes [12] . The time interval when T id changes is called a time period, at the beginning of a cycle, the content of the tape T cout of the Turing machine that is converted to q i is called the message of the periodic interaction. Let the private input of interactive Turing machine A and B be x a and x b respectively, and the public input be x, denoted as A(x a ), B(x b ) (x). When an interactive Turing machine A stops in T (· ) time, it means that for any interactive Turing machine B and any input x a , x b , and x, it will always enter the stop state in T (· ) time.
III. CROSS-NETWORK ISOLATION AND DATA EXCHANGE MODEL

A. MODEL STRUCTURE
The cross-network isolation and data exchange model mainly implements data exchange in two networks and exists in the form of a third-party inter-network isolation and data exchange system. Data exchange can be seen as a user in a network transmitting data to users in another network through a cross-network isolation and data exchange system between networks, and the user updates the received data. Therefore, the cross-network isolation and data exchange system needs to interact with users in the two networks separately, it interacts independently with two networks in temporally and physically. So, the exchange process is designed into three phases independently, and its structure is shown in Fig.1 . Because the security protection system of the business application system in the classified information system is responsible for the security and legality of the data itself, the crossnetwork isolation and data exchange system is mainly responsible for the secure transmission of data. the cross-network isolation and data exchange system needs to trust security protection system, and they cooperate to complete the data exchange. The cross-network isolation and data exchange systems are independent of the classified information system and therefore they are mutually untrustworthy. Under this premise, security is guaranteed to be the responsibility of the data exchange phase. Moreover, the data exchange phase should have a physical transport channel with physical level security and implement a detection mechanism for the authority and legitimacy of data that cannot be bypassed and cannot be spoofed without being trusted. Its trust mechanism is shown in Fig.2 . Thus, the three phases of the cross-network isolation and data exchange system function as follows: 1) Sending stage: Q and s perform two-way identity authentication, then s sends data x to Q, and the security protection system in S cooperates with Q to verify s's authority on x, preventing any information other than x from being leaked in the S network during the interaction and through the corresponding detection mechanism, it is guaranteed that all transmitted data in the whole phase is legal, so as to prevent any user in S from attacking Q or attacking the receiving network by isolating the security system. 2) Data exchange stage (physical security transmission):
Information processing within the isolated security system (including necessary encryption or detection, etc.) and physical security channel transmission. 3) Receiving stage: Q and r perform two-way identity authentication, then Q sends data x to r, and the security protection system in R cooperates with Q to verify r's authority on x, preventing r from leaking any information in the R network during the interaction and guarantee that all transmission data in the whole phase is legal, so as to prevent any user in R from attacking Q or attacking the receiving network S by isolating the security system.
The overall structure of the cross-network isolation and data exchange system is fully described above. Based on this structure, the Turing machine is used for theoretical model.
B. PERMISSION-BASED CLASSIFIED NETWORK
In a classified network, a complete data exchange involves changes in the data in the network where the sender and the receiver are located. Use mathematical language to represent data that is subject to user, authority, and operational constraints. According to the concept of data storage and indexing in a computer, each data has a corresponding storage address or index, such a storage address or index is represented as a string, such a string to represent a data.
Definition 4: String. A set is called the alphabet, if 2 ≤ | | < +∞ is satisfied. A string w is on the alphabet , if there is a non-negative positive integer n, make w ∈ n , where n is the Cartesian product of n sets , then call it the length of w, denoted as |w|. In particular, remember 0 = {ξ }, which indicates an empty string. The set of all strings is denoted as * , then * = n≥0 n (3) And without loss of generality, let = {0, 1}. For a set L ⊂ * of some data, called a language, any proposition can be represented by whether a certain data or statement belongs to a language L.
The basic operations of data generally include adding, deleting, searching, modifying, and so on.
Add operation: define the add function
If you need to increase the data set
where P(· ) is the power set. Delete operation: define the delete function
If you need to delete all the elements in the data set
Select operation: define the select function
If you need to output all the elements in that satisfy the feature function χ D (· ), then
where
Modify operation: Modification operations can be characterized by a combination of adding and deleting operations, VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. Cross-network isolation and data exchange system trust mechanism. and the modification operation can be regarded as a single
In summary, basic operations (add, delete, find, and modify) can be characterized by the intersection, union and complement of the data set. Similarly, some advanced operations such as sorting can be achieved by adding, deleting, checking, and modifying.
The data set in the classified network should contain permissions for all types of users on all operations. In a classified network, there must be a user with the highest authority to perform any operation on the whole network. At the same time, there must be a virtual user who can't do anything with any data, and this virtual user generally covers all types of users who have access illegally. At the same time, there are some operations that require multiple users to complete in series. For a certain permission, the data that multiple users can legally execute is legal for each user. Sometimes there are certain behavior that are performed by multiple users in parallel. Each user does the things within their own authority and finally completes the task behavior. Then, the data that can be legally executed only needs to be legally executed by one user. In order to describe the above two different cooperation methods, multiple serial or parallel partners are defined as virtual single users to facilitate the modelling and presentation of the model. In summary, the definition of a classified network based on rights is given.
Definition 5: Permission-based classified network. Let N = (X , I , J ) be a classified network, where X is the data set in the network. The set I indicates that there are |I | different levels of users in the network. The finite set J = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , |J | ) indicates that there are |J | different types of operations (such as add, delete, find and modify), where j ⊂ P(X ). The data set X is given the authority (I , J ) constitutes the confidential network N = (X , I , J ) if the following conditions are met:
1) For each different type of operation, the number of users at different levels is equal. i.e.
where [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} 2) For any i ∈ I , j ∈ [|J |], there is a unique set U (i,j) ∈ j ⊂ X , indicating that users of type j and level i have permissions U (i,j) , which indicates the range of data that the user of level i can perform with respect to the operations of type j. 3) For any two users ∀i 1 , i 2 ∈ I , there is a privilege generated by the serial cooperation of two users, i.e. the privilege pairing operation is finitely closed,
4) For any and at most countable users ⊂ I , There are permissions generated by multiple users working in parallel, i.e. the privilege pairing operation is countable closed,
5) For a classified network N , there is a certain i ∈ I that makes U (i,j) = X true for any j ∈ [|J |], and i is called the super permission of classified network N . 6) For a classified network N , there is a certain i ∈ I that makes U (i,j) = ∅ true for any j ∈ [|J |], and g is called illegal permission.
In definition 5, the data in network N is at most countable, and it is not required that the data in the network must be limited. It is possible to define all the storage fields in the database to form the entire data set X or to define all the fields in the database which can be calculated within the polynomial to form the set. Thus the condition that X is countable is reasonable. Furthermore, the number of users is not required to be limited, because any subset of X can be regarded as a user, although the number of users is always limited in practical applications. Since the set I is at most countable, when I is infinite, |I | means that its cardinality is countable (Alephnull). Since parallel cooperation can be seen as simultaneous multi-users, allowing up to several users to collaborate, serial cooperation can only allow a limited number of users to cooperate. In a confidential network, the premise that the data of two classified networks can be shared with each other is that all the data in the two networks can be determined by the pre-permission configuration to determine its authority attribution. Therefore, when considering the data update of the classified network, it is necessary to assume that the involved classified network are the subnet of a confidential network containing all the data. In practical applications, the data of the two networks is difficult to fully share. We only emphasize that for any of the shared parties, they have the ability to configure the permissions while obtaining the data of the other party. This does not mean that he really have some chance to get all the data from the other side.
Definition 6: Relationship between classified networks. Let N = (X , I , J ) be a classified network, A is a non-empty subset of X , denoted as
And
Then the classified network (A, I , J A ) is called the subnet of N .
Let N 1 = (X , I 1 , J 1 ) and N 2 = (X , I 2 , J 2 ) be classified networks on set X , if I 1 ⊂ I 2 and I 1 ⊂ I 2 have (1,i) ⊂ (2,i) for any i ∈ I 1 , then N 2 is said to be a thinner net than N 1 , whereas N 1 is a thicker net than N 2 .
C. PROOF SYSTEM
The sending and receiving stage is the interactive process between network users and the isolated security system. The interactive Turing machine is used to construct a system that describes the one-time proof behavior of both parties -the proof system. The prover can prove a certain fact to the verifier to realize the trusted authentication of network users and the isolated security system. Definition 7: Proof system. An interactive system P, V about language L is a proof system, if V is a polynomial interactive Turing machine and the system is complete and robust, where completeness means that there is a formula 16 for any x ∈ L and any private input x p and x v , i.e. the verifier determines that the probability of x ∈ L is greater than 2 \ 3 based on the information given by the prover.
Robustness means that there is a formula 17 for any x ∈ L, any interactive Turing machine P and any input x p and x v , i.e. the verifier determines that the probability of x ∈ L is less than 1 \ 3 based on the information given by the prover.
The output of P, V is the string that V outputs the tape when it is stopped.
In the process of mutual proof, the public input is generally used to describe some priori information that the verifier and the prover need to perform the proof protocol. To prove the authenticity of a statement x (if true, then x ∈ L, otherwise x / ∈ L) must be verified after the verifier V receives the statement sent by the prover P. However, the statement x does not necessarily need to be transmitted. The prover can sometimes provide the prover's evidence (i.e. the communication information during the interaction) without sending x, and then send the statement x when necessary, and the prover can Verification of the authenticity of the statement.
In the proof system, if the language L is the class BPP, i.e. the existence of (binary) probability polynomial Turing machine can determine L, then this proof system is trivial, that is to say, V only receive x can determine the authenticity of x. The probability 1\3 in the formula can be made close enough to 0 by performing the process of proving the system multiple times, and 2 \ 3 can also be close enough to 1 by performing the process of proving the system multiple times. But this will naturally bring about a negative impact on efficiency.
D. PHYSICAL TRANSMISSION CHANNEL
Definition 8: Physical secure channel transmission. The data transmission between A and B is called physical security transmission. If in a complete data transmission task, the transmission channel meets the requirements of the following physical layer: 1) Transmission integrity: There is only one transmission from A to B between A and B, and the data will not be intercepted, tampered with or forged. 2) Physical isolation: The transmission process is isolated from any third party outside. 3) Transmission independence: The transmission process is independent of the communicating party and the data itself and the transport bearer cannot control the transmission and the detection mechanism therein, i.e. any one of the communication, the data itself or carrier are unable to control transmission of multiple transmission between A and B, stopped transmission and failure retransmission, reverse transmission, bypass the agreement or deception detection mechanism (The transmission mechanism and detection mechanism are completely independent of the choice of strategy and execution by the inter-network isolation and data exchange system).
E. CROSS-NETWORK ISOLATION AND DATA EXCHANGE MODEL
The various parts of the isolated safety system have been characterized. The complete definition of the isolated safety system is given below and discussed that the proposed isolation safety system is theoretically configurable. Definition 9: Cross-network isolation and data exchange theoretical model.
Let N = (X , I , J ) be a classified network, and two subnets N 1 = (X 1 , I , J 1 ) and N 2 = (X 2 , I , J 2 ) in N exist respectively as user s and r. Recorded as
Respectively represents all data that can be operated by user s and r;
Respectively represent the language in which data x ∈ X 1 can be legally transmitted, where J 1,x ⊂ J 1 and J 2,x ⊂ J 1 respectively represent the set of operations that s and r must perform during the transmission of x, and L Q is the language that the isolated system can legally transfer. L is the set of all non-malicious data and satisfies L Q ⊂ L. Say a pair of interactive Turing machine Q = (Q s , Q r ) about a classified network N = (X , I , J ) is an isolated security system if the following conditions are met for any x ∈ X 1 : ( U s,x ), Q s (L s , I , x) , there is a polynomial probability Turing machine that satisfies M s (L s , I , x) and the random variable has the same distribution, i.e. it satisfies
3) r( V r,x ), Q r (L r , I , x) is a proof system for the language V r,x , where L r ⊂ L Q is the data set that Q r considers to be non-malicious in interaction with r. 4) For any output y of r( V r,x ), Q r (L r , I , x), there is a polynomial probability Turing machine M r that satisfies M r (L r , I , x) and the random variable y has the same distribution, i.e. it satisfies
5) The physical secure channel is transmitted between Q s and Q r . The premise that N 1 = (X 1 , I , J 1 ) and N 2 = (X 2 , I , J 2 ) need to exchange data is to ensure that they are subnets of a confidential network N = (X , I , J ). Note that N generally has only theoretical meaning and does not exist in the real world. Assuming that N 1 sends data x ∈ X 1 to N 2 , the existence of N guarantees that N 2 has the ability to configure the permissions of x ∪ X 2 . For users s and r, their private inputs in the proof system are U s,x and V r,x respectively, which describes all the information they have except sending data x. For the isolated security system Q = (Q s , Q r ), the acceptable languages of their own detection devices are L s and L r and should satisfy
Otherwise, the isolation security system cannot guarantee that all illegal data are successfully detected and blocked. Under the consideration of security, all legal inputs are not required to be successfully transmitted. However, if L s and L r are too small, the isolated security system may not be able to implement effective data transmission, but security can still be guaranteed (the security can be guaranteed even without any data transmission). This point can be said that the trivial isolation security system defined in definition 9 must exist (When L s = L r = ∅, it can be constructed). Although as a detection mechanism of the isolation system itself, the security of the isolated security system should not be based on the confidentiality of its detection mechanism, so L s and L r should be used as public input. Since the realization of the system function requires the cooperation of the security protection system on the business system and the isolated security system, the user information in the classified network should be public, and thus x and I are public inputs. In addition, the languages U s,x and V r,x proved by the proof system mean that all the rights information related to J 1 and J 1 should be public and subject to prior configuration and convention. In order to ensure the efficient operation of the isolated security system, the isolated security system should not obtain any information more than x ∈ U s,x and x ∈ V r,x after completing the transmission of any data x, thus ensuring that the receiver cannot obtain any information about the sender other than x.
F. DATA EXCHANGE SECURITY CERTIFICATES
This section will give the conditions for classified network security data exchange according to the principle that all operations are within the legal scope and all changes are within the legal scope, and according to this condition, a theoretically proof that the security of data exchange in the proposed cross-network isolation and data exchange model will be given. This security guarantees that the two networks of data exchange are not threatened by this operation. The premise is that the security detection mechanism of the inter-network isolation and data exchange model has isolated the threat of the data itself, such as eavesdropping, tampering, and interception.
Definition 10: Secure data exchange. For the two classified networks N 1 = (X 1 , I , J 1 ) and N 2 = (X 2 , I , J 2 ), they are subnets of network N = (X , I , J ). Suppose N 1 needs to transfer data set D ⊂ X 1 with permission i 1 ∈ I to data set D ∪ X 2 of network N 2 , and D has permission i 2 ∈ I in N 2 . Assuming that the network where data interaction ends are N 1 = (X 1 , I , J 1 ) and N 2 = (X 2 , I , J 2 ), then the following conditions should be met:
1) Network N 1 will not change, N 1 = N 1 ,i.e.
2) In network N 1 , i 1 is eligible to process D. Suppose
3) In network N 2 , i 2 is eligible to receive data D.Suppose
where V i 2 ,j | X is the data set that permissions V i 2 ,j can operate on network N = (X , I , J ). 4) In network N 2 , no changes will occur except for the data D 2 will be updated.
Because for each data exchange, the operations of both users are legal, and there is no change in the data set of the two networks except the receiving data set D in the receiving network, and both sides of the data sharing behavior does not require the participation of the third party, and therefore does not send any form of interaction with a third party. This means that in a finite number of multi-party interactions, all structures in the classified network are not transformed except for the legal data addition of the data sets of the parties during the interaction. This shows that definition 10 is well defined and reasonable. A system for processing confidential Internet data exchange that satisfies the definition 10 condition is considered to be capable of data exchange securely.
Theorem 1: Isolated security system can realize secure data exchange.
Proof: Since the transmitted data are encrypted, all data including the calculated data are not backed up. Then there are polynomial probabilistic Turing machine M s and M r so that in one transmission of data, the knowledge obtained by Q can be expressed as
where M q is a polynomial probabilistic Turing machine that represents all the calculations performed by Q after a job is performed. Note that the middle of Q s and Q r is a physical safety channel, so M q cannot acquire both I , x) ) inputs. Therefore, the data transmitted by the isolated security system for multiple times will not be accumulated, and the security will not be reduced. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the user s transmitting on the confidential network N 1 = (X 1 , I , J 1 ) sends the data set D = {x} to the user r in the classified network N 2 = (X 2 , I , J 2 ) through the two-way isolated security system Q.
With the definition 6, since Q s and Q r are transmitted through the physical secure transmission channel, there is no other data transmission other than the data x. Therefore, network N 1 changes only by proof system s( U s,x ), Q s (L s , I , x), and N 2 changes only by proof system r( V r,x ), Q r (L r , I , x). Since the proof system itself only works on the data, thus
Investigate the user s ∈ I \ {s} in N 1 , because the transmission between s and Q s is encrypted, so other users can't get any knowledge, then
Furthermore, Q s has selfless input, so s will not gain additional knowledge in the interaction process. For data y generated in any interaction process, there is a polynomial probability polynomial Turing machine M * s that makes
Therefore, in the sense of blocking the polynomial probabilistic polynomial Turing machine
In summary, the definition 10 condition (1) is satisfied. During the transmission, Q s only receives the data in x ∈ L s , but if s wants to transmit the data in L Q \ L S , it can prove x ∈ U s,x through the proof system r( V r,x ), Q r (L r , I , x) and then transmit, so it may as well set L S = L Q . Let's do the same VOLUME 7, 2019 thing with L r = L Q . Proof system r( V r,x ), Q r (L r , I , x) guarantees x ∈ U s,x , so x must not be malicious and meet the permission requirements, thus for any
This means that s cannot transmit data that can attack Q or network N 2 . There is a polynomial probabilistic Turing machine M s satisfies M s (L s , I , x) and the random variable y has the same distribution, i.e. it satisfies
This also means that other users in N 1 cannot get any additional information, and data x meets the permission requirements. The above illustrates that the definition 10 condition (2) is satisfied.
Similarly can prove that for any V i 2 ,j ∈ 2,j ∈ J 2,x , there is
This means that cannot transmit data that can attack Q or network N 2 . There is a polynomial probabilistic Turing machine M r satisfies M r (L r , I , x) and the random variable y has the same distribution, i.e. it satisfies
Therefore, the data x satisfies the permission requirement, which satisfies the condition (3) of the definition 10.
Investigate the user r ∈ I \ {r} in N 2 , Because the transmission between r and Q r is encrypted, so other users can't get any knowledge, then
Furthermore, Q r has selfless input, so r will not gain additional knowledge besides x in the interaction process. For data y generated in any interaction process, there is a polynomial probability polynomial Turing machine M * r that makes
In summary, the definition 10 condition (4) is satisfied. In summary, it is proved that the Turing machine-based isolated security system can safely exchange data.
IV. CROSS-NETWORK ISOLATION AND DATA EXCHANGE FUNCTION MODEL
This chapter will design a generalized cross-network isolation and data exchange function model based on the proposed cross-network isolation and data exchange theory model. It is equivalent to providing a design strategy from theoretical model to functional model. According to the rationality of the functional model and generality of dynamically adjust the security component in the scope of theoretical model definition at design stage to indicate the rationality and generality of the proposed theoretical model.
A. FUNCTION MODEL
The cross-network isolation and data exchange system is implemented by the security hardening function of some security components. The security proof of these functions needs to be abstracted into corresponding provable mathematical models, usually protocols or algorithms. Based on this, the function of describing a cross-network isolation and data exchange system can be described by some protocols and some detection algorithms to implement some functions and ensure their security. In general, the protocol or the detection algorithm used can be calculated at polynomial time, and a protocol or algorithm security means that the attacker can no longer obtain any confidential information in polynomial time.
Definition 11: Abstract scheme. Defined as an ordered set of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, i.e. = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , . . . , A n ), where the polynomial time probability algorithm corresponds to a polynomial time probability Turing machine. Let A be a probability algorithm, for a fixed input w, A(w) is a distribution. The functional model for defining an cross-network isolation and data exchange model is T = (B, F) , where B = ( 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . , n ) represents n abstract schemes for building functional trees and implementing their functions. F = (F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , . . . , F m ) represents m independent detection algorithms, typically used for data detection between protocols, etc.
This paper points out that in the process of executing the cross-network isolation and data exchange system described by the functional model, if the previous functional component finds an illegal situation, then the next process will be interrupted. Specifically, for a functional component connected in series, the next functional component is executed only when the previous function is completed and the operation is legal, and for the parallel functional component, only when all the functional components are completed and the operation is legal.
In the data exchange phase, the physical security of communication between Q s and Q r depends on the transport channels of Q s and Q r . According to definition 10, a physical one-way transmission or a one-time physical transmission satisfied the definition can be constructed to construct a physical secure transmission path. For the security of Q s and Q r , it is necessary to design a functional tree that satisfies the security of the transmission phase and reception phase of the inter-network isolation and data exchange system.
The sending phase essentially constructs a proof system
is the set of permission operations that all processing x needs to do, L is all non-malicious message sets and satisfies L s ⊂ L Q ⊂ L. The first part can choose the appropriate identity authentication protocol. Therefore, the sending stage is divided into three parts: s needs to send an ID to Q s , Then transmit x ∈ U s,j ∩ L evidence to Q s , Finally send data x. The three parts can be implemented independently. The second part can choose the appropriate message authentication code (or digital signature), encryption protocol, data detection algorithm and malicious code detection algorithm. Finally, the third part only needs to use the message authentication code and encryption protocol to transmit data. Then the function tree of the sending phase is shown in Fig.3 . Similarly, we can use similar tools and methods to construct a proof system r( V r,x ), Q r (L r , I , x).
In Figure 3 ,let B i = (IAC i , KE i , AA i , MAC i , SKE i ) and F i = (Check i ), B i contain five protocols, IAC i represents the identity authentication protocol for the sender, KE i represents the key exchange protocol with the sender, MAC i represents sender's message authentication and SKE i represents symmetric key encryption for sender and cross-network isolation and data exchange system, AA i represents authority authentication, detection algorithm Check i for malicious code detection algorithm for senders, where i ∈ {s, r}, then the functional model of the transmission phase and the reception phase is shown in Fig.4 . Fig.4 is a functional tree that satisfies the cross-network isolation and data exchange system, where PTC is a secure physical transmission channel.
Proof: For the last two conditions of definition 10, PTC is a secure physical transmission channel, thus satisfying the condition. Since the protocol itself is repeatable and efficient, it only needs to ensure the non-backup of the physical configuration at the same time, so, when only consider the function tree, the last two conditions are already met.
Due to the symmetry, we only need to verify the first two conditions of definition 10. Since there is no difference in the single and double directional cross-network isolation and data exchange system during the transmission phase, we only need to verify single directional class of the definitions. We assume that every functional component, ie each protocol, is secure. The security of the key distribution protocol and the identity authentication itself ensures that the communication of the first two functions is secure and that the identity can be confirmed, and the key is distributed in preparation for subsequent transmission of the data.
In the proof system s(
, each data transmission will perform message authentication and encryption, and in the last communication cycle, the data will be sent with message which has executed message authentication and encryption. When the authentication protocol and the encryption protocol are simultaneously executed, generally for the transmitted message, there are three possible combinations.The first one is independently signature and encryption, the next one is signature and then encryption, and the last one is encryption then signature. The first one is unsecure, and the signature does not guarantee the confidentiality of the data. For the latter two, we recommend the method of encrypting and then signing. Its security is relatively higher. If the signature is first did and then encrypted, the encrypted plaintext has a certain structure, which may result in a decrease in the security of the encryption protocol. After the non-repudiation and confidentiality transmission, the rights authentication protocol authenticates x ∈ U s,j through all the data which Q s receive sent by s. At the same time, the transmitted evidence v ∈ L Q is guaranteed throughout the transmission, which will guarantee x ∈ L. Therefore, in the end, x ∈ U s,x can be guaranteed.The working mechanism of protocols and algorithms other than privilege authentication is clear. The working mechanism of the authority authentication AA s will be presented below, that is, what specific tools and strategies are used to enable the proof system s( U s,x ), Q s (L s , I , x) to indeed achieve the certification work of x ∈ U s,x . The proof of x ∈ U s,j depends on J 1 . Strictly, the hash value of all the data in U s,j can realize the proof of x ∈ U s,j . The proof of x ∈ L depends on the L s corresponding to the detection algorithm Check s . If L s = L Q ⊂ L, then the proof system provides that it will be ordinary, that is, x ∈ L can be prove without any evidence provided by S. But the VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 5. Simplified cross-network isolation and data exchange system functional model. non-malicious language L has no formal definition. Whether it is NP (polynomial verifiable decision-making language) is unknown, so strictly,we can require L 0 ⊂ L , for example, Check s to detect in whitelist form, but L 0 can't be too small, because L 0 is too small to prove x ∈ L .
The distribution protocol KE s can be used for identity authentication, message authentication, and encryption. The key of the distribution protocol is generated by the key generation function, and the key generation function is independent of the message, which means that the first two functional components do not make s( U s,x ), Q s (L s , I , x) get any knowledge about x. In addition, when entering the AA s protocol, Q s is no longer in communicate with S, so we only need to prove that Q s are unable to obtain any relevant knowledge about x in the process of s( U s,x ), Q s (L s , I , x) transmitting evidence. On the one hand, if L s = L Q ,the entire proof system does not require L s = L Q to provide any evidence, which must be zero-knowledge at this time. On the other hand, if L s ⊂ L Q , but L s is enough to prove x ∈ U s,j ∩ L Q , then there must exist a zero-knowledge proof protocol. In fact, just need Check s to configure many various evidence in the whitelist which is required to be received in the zero-knowledge proof protocol for the proof of x ∈ L Q ⊂ L, the evidence is obviously non-malicious.
The order of KE s and IAC s depends on whether IAC s needs a key.No matter which identity authentication protocol is used, it is suitable for definition. However, it is recommended to use an identity authentication protocol based on zero-knowledge proof. At the same time, MAC s can be replaced by digital signature, and SKE s can also be replaced by public key encryption scheme, they can all ensure that the channels of Q s and s are kept secret.
In summary, it is proved that the proposed theoretical system of cross-network isolation and data exchange is reasonable, and its simplified functional model is shown in Fig.5 . It is noted that IAC i and KE i are exchangeable when a specific protocol is involved, and the encryption protocol may use a symmetric or asymmetric encryption scheme, and the message authentication protocol may also be replaced by a digital signature. The malicious code detection algorithm can use the same detection algorithm, namely Check s = Check r . In addition, for the two-way isolated security system, the same protocol can be used in both the send phase and the data exchange phase, that is, for any s , r ∈ B, s = r is true.
According to the simplified version of the functional model structure given in Fig.5 , the security measures and equipment of each layer are added to design a series of specific cross-network isolation and data exchange systems that meet different security requirements. More functional components can be added, including approvals, security audits, and other ancillary components. A relatively complete and generalized cross-network isolation and data exchange systems function tree is given below, as shown in Fig.6 . Due to the symmetry, only the send phase and the transmission phase are given. As (B, F) = (B s ∪ B r ∪ {PTC}, F s ∪ F r ) and for i ∈ {s, r}, there are
B. FUNCTIONAL MODEL RATIONALITY VERIFICATION
To further verify the rationality of the above functional model, the functional model will be verified using Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. ''Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation'' ISO/IEC 15408 [16] , referred to as the CC standard, is currently the most authoritative standard for information system security certification. The latest version of the standard GB/T 18336-2015 was released in 2015. This article is mainly verified by this version of the CC standard. The CC standard mainly includes three parts. The first part is the introduction of the CC standard and the general model of the safety evaluation. The second part introduces the safety function requirements for standardizing IT (information technology) products, and the third part propose a series of security requirements for the safety requirements which IT products and system during the development process. For these three parts, this paper mainly uses the second part of the CC standard to verify that the proposed functional model meets the internationally recognized common security functional requirements. In the second part, the current nationally recognized common security functional requirements are defined in terms of the ''class-family-component'' three-tier structure, including 11 classes, 66 families, and 135 components. 11 classes are introduced as shown in Table 1 .
For the cross-network isolation and data exchange function model designed according to the theoretical model of cross-network isolation and data exchange, the corresponding relationship between the functional components and the CC standard classes is shown in Table 2 .
It can be concluded from the table that the cross-network isolation and data exchange function model proposed according to the theoretical model of cross-network isolation and data exchange conforms to the CC standard. 
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF CROSS-NETWORK ISOLATION AND DATA EXCHANGE MODEL BASED ON FUNCTIONAL MODEL
This section will gives numerical evaluation results of safety and performance for five basic security attributes (confidentiality, integrity, availability, controllability, and nonrepudiation) and three basic capabilities (efficiency, robustness, and cost performance) of cross-network isolation and data exchange, based on the subjective and objective comprehensive weighting method.
A. SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE COMPREHENSIVE EMPOWERMENT
The subjective and objective methods selected in this paper are the analytic hierarchy process and the entropy method. For a multi-attribute decision problem, assuming that there are n indicators and l kinds of weighting methods, the weights obtained for the kth weighting method are expressed as W k = (W 1k , W 2k , . . . , W nk ), k = 1, 2, . . . , l, where W nk ≥ 0. This paper uses the analytic hierarchy process and the entropy method, so l = 2. The combined weight of the weights of the l kinds of weighting methods is the final weight, i.e.
The final weight vector is expressed as W c = (W c1 , W c2 , . . . , W cn ) T . θ l represents the coefficient of each weighting method, θ l ≥ 0, and θ l satisfies the unitization constraint l k=0 θ 2 k = 1, and θ * = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ l ) is the combination coefficient that maximizes the multi-attribute comprehensive evaluation value of the scheme, that is, the optimal combination coefficient. It is calculated as follows.
Combining the weights of all weighting methods into a block matrix 
to obtain a symmetric matrix W T B 1 W , so that the feature vector θ * = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ l ) is calculated as the optimal combination coefficient.
B. MODEL SAFETY ASSESSMENT
The model safety assessment numerical result is denoted as SE, which is from the synthesized calculation of five basic safety attributes: confidentiality, integrity, availability, controllability and non-repudiation. According to the function tree shown in Fig.6 , in this paper, a group of components processed in parallel is divided into the same module, so there are 6 modules in the sending phase and the receiving phase respectively. as shown in the following
There have 13 modules if the transmission phase module PTC is added. 1 to 6 are send phase modules, 7 is a transmission module, and 8 to 13 are reception phase modules. Each module has basic evaluation related parameters, additional evaluation related parameters and performance evaluation related parameters. For example, the basic evaluation parameters include safety intensity parameters such as unsafe, weak safety, safety and strong safety. These parameters are determined by experts. Each module consists of a basic evaluation value se 0 and an additional evaluation value se 1 and an anti-attack evaluation se 2 , the additional evaluation value consists of the detection algorithm evaluation se 1 , the protocol evaluation se 2 and the safety measure evaluation se 3 .
In conclusion, the composition of SE is shown in fig.7 .
In Fig.7 , the security strength evaluation se 1 is divided into four phase values 80, 70, 60, 0, and the security weight b is 90, 80, 70, 60. Anti-attack evaluation se 2 = M b T w , where M is the total value of se 2 , which is set to 10
, 1} indicates whether it can resist the ith attack type. w represents the weight of each type of attack and is calculated by the subjective and objective comprehensive weighting method. From this, the basic evaluation value is se 0 = se 1 + se 2 .
For additional evaluation values, the detection algorithm evaluates se 1 = −ln(c · p 1 ), where p 1 is the error rate of the detection algorithm. The protocol evaluates se 2 = −ln(c · T · ε(λ)), where λ is the key length, T is the key update period, ε(λ) is the probability of being successfully attacked, and c is a constant, generally assumed to be 1. The security measure evaluates se 3 = n 1 w i ln(β i ), where β i is the evaluation value of the ith security measure and is generally determined by the probability of defensive success. where c is a constant, which is generally assumed to be 1. For the evaluation of the transmission module, this paper mainly considers the three properties of transmission integrity, physical isolation and transmission independence. The evaluation values for the three properties are respectively recorded as se 1 , se 2 , se 3 . The weight of each indicator corresponding to each property is w i = (w i,1 , w i,2 , . . . , w i,n ) T (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}), which is calculated by subjective and objective comprehensive weighting method. The metric parameter for physical transmission is α = (α 1 , α 1 , . . . , α n ) T , and α j ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the transmission module security evaluation value se = 100 
In summary, the evaluation value of the five security attributes is SE j = 13 i=1 w ji se i , j = 1, 2, . . . , 5, where w ji represents the weight of the module corresponding to each different security attribute and is obtained by the subjective and objective comprehensive weighting method. se i represents the security evaluation value of each module. Finally, the safety evaluation value of the model is
SE i . Table 3 shows the safety evaluation values of each module. Table 4 shows the five attributes of the model and the comprehensive safety assessment values.
C. MODEL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section is based on a functional model that is quantitatively evaluated in terms of efficiency, robustness, and cost performance.
Efficient Eff = k , where ε(λ) is the probability of being successfully attacked.
The system cost performance assessment includes economic cost performance and efficiency. Economic cost performance Ecp = se N i=1 mc i , where se is the total value of safety assessment and Eff is the evaluation value of efficiency. Table 5 shows the results of performance evaluation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper mathematically models the constraint of the user, data and permission in the classified network, and uses the Turing machine construction proof system to prove the legality of the data operation, it avoids the threat brought by the traditional access control strategy and ensure the security before data transmission. The physical security transmission channel guarantees the confidentiality, integrity and reliability of data transmission. Each part rigorously constitutes a theoretical model of cross-network isolation and data exchange, and can safely realize data exchange between classified networks, independent of the classified network, reducing the burden of a large number of deployments on the classified network, it can adjust the security detection components in the cross-network isolation and data exchange model according to the security requirements of classified networks to improve network performance and reduce redundancy.
